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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide two arguments against David
Gauthier’s version of contractarianism. The purpose of these two arguments
is to weaken the cumulative case for this view. Contractarianism, in brief,
attempts to offer us a theory of morals by agreement. This theory provides
answers to the following questions. Which moral claims are we justified in
making? Why are these claims justified?
Drawing on the Hobbesian tradition, persons are seen as primarily
disposed to pursue their own interests. Thus, any moral claims that inhibit
these interests must be justified. Gauthier’s test for justified moral claims
comes in the form of an agreement. Justified moral claims are those that self‐
interested persons would accept. Thus, the agreement is hypothetical and
not actual, or historical. But the parties to the agreement are actual persons.
Not all of our existing moral claims pass this test; a good many of our
moral claims fail it and are, consequently, unjustified. But despite this fact,
we still have a good reason to comply with justified moral claims: it makes us
better off. By agreeing to constrain some of our interests, rather than not
agreeing to constrain any of them, we are able to gain the benefits of
cooperation with others. These benefits are available only to those who so
cooperate. So, the two questions are answered. Which moral claims are we
justified in making? Those claims that self‐interested persons would agree
upon. Why are these claims justified? Because they make available benefits
otherwise unavailable to us. We are, then, provided with a theory of
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morality: morals by agreement. All of this will be fleshed out in a fair
amount of detail in the first section.
The first argument of the present paper is as follows. According to
Gauthier, if, upon making this hypothetical agreement, we come to realize
that the terms of the agreement itself rely on a conception of morality that is
not the object of agreement, we will come to view the agreement as tainted,
or unstable.1 To re‐establish the agreement on more stable grounds, each
party to it will, he supposes, consider which moral claims each would accept
in a pre‐moral, pre‐social situation. The agreement, since it then proceeds
from a situation that escapes prior influence of any moral conception, will be
a purer, or more stable, test for morality.
I will argue that were we to engage in this task of imagining ourselves
in such a situation, the resulting imagined person would be quite foreign to
ourselves. This hypothetical person, then, is the party to the agreement. The
constraints that she would choose in such a situation then appear irrelevant
to us. Since these constraints form the object of the agreement, then the
hypothetical agreement itself is irrelevant to us. Thus, contractarianism
lacks the resources to provide the agreement with the stability that Gauthier
insists is needed in order to justify morality.
The second argument responds to a thesis of Gauthier’s that morality
faces a foundational crisis and that contractarianism is the only plausible

1

This term is Gauthier’s, and it will be explained in due course.
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resolution of it. I will argue that Gauthier’s resolution to it, deliberative
justification, implies an implausible view of moral evaluation.
Moral rationalism, or the view that morality provides good reasons
for action, is presented and then bolstered as an alternative view to
contractarianism. Once the plausibility of this view is in place, it becomes
clear that Gauthier’s resolution is implausible.
With these two arguments presented, the cumulative case for
contractarianism will be weakened. Section 1 will outline Gauthier’s view. I
will then provide the two arguments explained above, in Sections 2 and 3
respectively. I will conclude by offering some comments about answering
the moral skeptic; it may not be the role of the moral philosopher to do this.
Section I: Gauthier’s Contractarianism
Social contract theory, in a distinctly modern form, can be traced back
to Thomas Hobbes; it is the idea that morality (or political authority) is
grounded, or legitimated, or justified, by an agreement of some sort. John
Locke is, of course, another member of this tradition, as is Jean‐Jacques
Rousseau and Immanuel Kant.2
In the twentieth‐century, social contract theorists can be viewed as
belonging to roughly one of two camps.3 Contractualists, descending from
For a detailed treatment of this tradition, see J. W. Gough, The Social
Contract: A Critical Study of Its Development. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1936. See also Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
3 For more on this distinction, see Jean Hampton, “Two Faces of
Contractarian Thought” in Contractarianism and Rational Choice. Ed Peter
Vallentyne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
2
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Kant’s moral philosophy, hold that it follows from the concept of a rational
being that there exist certain constraints on the actions of each. Rational
persons are those that seek the interests of everyone. It follows then, that
some constraints are necessary for the attainment of the interests of all. For,
if there were no constraints, then these interests would not be served.
Contractualists explain these constraints by way of an agreement. John
Rawls4 and Thomas Scanlon5 are two more contemporary proponents of this
camp.
Contractarians, by contrast, descend from the Hobbesian tradition.
One general assumption of this camp is that humans are primarily self‐
interested and that morality can be shown to be the most rational way to
serve our interests. Gauthier and Jan Narveson6 are two influential
contemporary proponents of this camp. Each camp holds that morality
proceeds from rationality by way of a contract between rational parties. The
remainder of this section will be devoted to outlining David Gauthier’s
contractarianism.
Gauthier provides us with a theory of morals by agreement.7 It
attempts to derive moral principles from rational choice theory. This latter
theory seeks to provide the general principles of choice underlying how
4Rawls’

view is most fully developed in John Rawls. A Theory of Justice.
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.
5 A good exposition of Scanlon’s view is Thomas Scanlon. What We Owe To
Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1998.
6 Jan Narveson. The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1988.
7 The summary here provided is drawn primarily from David Gauthier,
Morals By Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
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humans, if they are to be rational, should act. Part of rational choice theory is
the claim that persons are disposed to seek their own interest. Since
cooperation with others is more likely to bring greater advantage to an
individual, it is recognized as a rational choice. However, cooperation with
others calls for constraints on each individual’s choices, in order to avoid
exploitation. For, if each were to act only to serve her self‐interest and there
were no constraints, then it is likely that there would be many cases of
exploitation, since exploitation would be seen as an efficient means to gain
greater advantage. Exploitation would be avoided if each were to comply
with some constraints. Gauthier identifies these abovementioned constraints
as moral principles. Moral principles, then, enable each individual to seek
her own interest through interaction with others in a better way than she
could without others. I will now flesh out this sparse summary.
Gauthier begins developing his theory by explaining the conception of
rationality that underlies rational choice theory. This conception of
rationality is instrumental; it is a kind of means‐ends rationality. Following
Hume, a person’s desires are asserted to be neither rational nor irrational.
When a person takes means to procure the ends she desires, she is said to be
instrumentally rational.8
This conception of rationality he calls the maximizing conception of
rationality. Since rational actions are those that procure for us the objects of
our interest, we are rational if we pursue those objects. Gauthier identifies
8

Ibid. p. 21.
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interest with preference, so that a person acts rationally to the extent that
she seeks to fulfill her preferences. It is important to note here that one can
have a preference involving the well‐being of others. I may prefer to see that
you are happy; if something I do makes you happy, and I am aware of this,
then my preference is fulfilled. Lacking this preference, however, I have no
reason to do anything to see that you are happy. On the maximizing
conception, then, there is no reason for us to be moral if we do not prefer it.
To illustrate these features of the maximizing conception, he draws a
contrast with the universalistic conception of rationality, which derives from
Kant. On this conception, a person is acting rationally only if she seeks the
interests of everyone. Therefore, says Gauthier, the universalistic conception
already has the moral dimension of impartial constraint built into it.9 This
conception of rationality contains an explanation of why a person should be
moral: to constrain your actions is a part of being rational. A person is acting
rationally if she seeks to satisfy the interests of all rational beings. Hence,
constraints on an individual’s actions are necessary in order to ensure that
everyone’s interests are satisfied. The relation between reason and morality
is clear: one must be moral in order to be rational.
On the maximizing conception, however, the relation between reason
and morals is unclear. For, if a rational choice is one that maximizes our
preference‐fulfillment, then what need have we for any notion of constraint?
There is no explanation for its necessity. The main task of Gauthier’s theory
Gauthier describes the traditional understanding of morality as an
“impartial constraint on the pursuit of individual interest.” Ibid. p. 7.

9
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is, thus, to explain why morality is required for a rational person. We thus
are provided with a theory that clarifies the nature of the relation between
reason and morals. It explains how, even though we are primarily disposed
to seek our self‐interested preferences, morality is needed in order to better
promote the fulfillment of those preferences. Morality is a means to their
fulfillment; it is (instrumentally) rational to be moral.
For Gauthier, a person is conceived as “an independent centre of
activity, endeavouring to direct his capacities and resources to the fulfillment
of his interests.”10 There is no room for constraint; each person initially
approaches a choice situation with no limits on what she may or may not do.
How, then, does a person come to recognize any constraints on her actions?
Where does morality come from if it is not already present to us?
Understanding morality as arising out of an agreement offers an answer to
this question.
This agreement is not an actual, historical event. Rather, it is an event
in a thought‐experiment intended to establish why it is better that each of us
should choose to live with some constraints, rather than with none. The
agreement is hypothetical, but the parties to it are actual people. If actual,
rational persons were to engage in a bargain, wherein they came to an
agreement about which, if any, constraints would be acceptable to each, then
a distinction between what may and may not be done is provided. The
agreement is hypothetical in that it picks out what each rational person would
10

Ibid. p. 9.
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agree to; but the bargainers are actual, rational people. If each person were
to consider which constraints she would prefer, then an agreement is
reached; it is that set of constraints that everyone would choose.
But if everyone were free from constraint, why would anyone engage
in such a bargain? Each person will come to see the benefits available to her
through cooperation with others. If each person comes to realize that, by
pursuing these goods, she will maximize her own preference‐fulfillment, then
each will voluntarily engage in the bargain. As this is recognized, the place
for constraint becomes quite clear to those parties to the agreement. It is to
increase the future likelihood of the cooperation of others.
It becomes more complicated, says Gauthier, when we consider that
although the agreement is hypothetical, it demonstrates the rationality of
actual constraint. What has the content of some thought‐experiment to do
with constraints on my actions? This challenge must be answered by any
theory of morals, says Gauthier.
The theory he offers answers this challenge, and in a more rigorous
(and thus superior) way than many past contractarian theories. Gauthier
traces the history of moral contractarianism back to the Greek Sophists.
Thomas Hobbes is identified as the true progenitor of Gauthier’s form of the
theory. More recently, he counts G. R. Grice11 and Kurt Baier12 as co‐workers
in this enterprise. Gauthier, however, bolsters this conceptual history by the
G. R. Grice. The Grounds of Moral Judgement. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1967.
12 Kurt Baier. The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1958.
11
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addition of rational choice theory. Doing so is able to answer a number of
questions: “why rational persons would agree ex ante to constraining
principles [i.e. why we would be motivated to begin bargaining at all], what
general characteristics these principles must have as objects of rational
agreement [explained below], and why rational persons would comply ex
post [after the agreement] with the agreed constraints.”13 By invoking
rational choice theory, then, we are able to see why we should agree to
comply with constraints: simply because it is rational. This explanation,
however, is more rigorous than past attempts, since it corroborates with a
separate theory of how all rational persons should make choices.
Why is the hypothetical agreement itself rational? The rationality of
the agreement becomes clear when the role of society in an individual’s life is
considered. Society is stipulated as a cooperative venture, existing for the
benefit of each member of it. Contractarians assume that some degree of
sociability is a characteristic feature of humanity. Hence, we tend to live in
societies. However, only when social interaction is beneficial to each
individual is it considered rational. Since we are social creatures, tending to
live in societies, it appears that an agreement is rational from the perspective
of each; if I am already disposed to live among others, I might as well agree to
cooperate with them.
So, Gauthier has shown us why we would be motivated to make an
agreement, but why should we comply with the constraints agreed upon
13

Gauthier, p. 10.
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once the agreement is finished? Contractarianism begins from this
presumption against morality.14 Why agree to comply with the constraints of
a hypothetical agreement at all? Gauthier takes pains to make us feel the
force of this challenge, for he says, if his theory is successful, it defeats this
initial presumption against morality.
Gauthier identifies four features central to his theory. The first is that
of the “morally free zone” of the idealized market.15 A market, Gauthier
argues, is free from constraint. In a perfectly competitive market, mutual
advantage is assured if each individual pursues her own interests without
constraint. Hence, there is no rational need for constraint. Moreover, since
each person enjoys the same advantage in market interaction as she would
non‐socially, there is no partiality within market interaction. Hence, there is
no moral need for constraint.16 Thus, the market is morally free. It serves as
a foil against which morality becomes clearer; if the world were such a
market, morality would be unnecessary. Of course, the world is not such a
market. Unethical business practices are engaged in all the time. Hence,
some constraint is needed. The idealized market exhibits a natural harmony
among participating parties; morality makes possible an artificial harmony.
“Market and morals share the non‐coercive reconciliation of individual
interest [or, preference‐fulfillment] with mutual benefit.”17
Ibid. p. 8.
Ibid. p. 13.
16 The assumption here is that morality is a set of impartial constraints on
individual preference‐fulfillment.
17 Ibid. p. 14.
14
15
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The second feature central to his theory is as follows. When
individual constraint becomes necessary, this is achieved through rational
agreement. A necessary condition on this agreement is that it be mutually
advantageous, but what is sufficient for such an agreement? This gives rise
to the bargaining problem for the bargainers; it consists of deciding which,
among a number of possible agreements, is the most advantageous to each
bargainer.
Solving this problem leads to two principles that guide both the
process of and the content of rational agreement. Beginning from an
assumption of the equal rationality of all parties involved, the first principle
is arrived at: each party will concede as little as possible relative to what he
contributes. Likewise, a second principle is identified: each party will
benefit as much as possible relative to what he contributes. Since these
principles capture both fairness and impartiality, they provide a basis for
justice.
The third feature central to his theory is that of constrained
maximization. Gauthier considers it a weakness of much past contractarian
theory that it has not been able to deal with the rationality of compliance.
Granted, it may be rational to make agreements based on the two principles I
outlined in the previous paragraph, but is it not equally rational to ignore
these if it serves an individual’s interests? To answer this question, Gauthier
distinguishes between straightforward maximizers and constrained
maximizers. The former is disposed to maximize her own interest in the
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particular choices she makes. However, a constrained maximizer will comply
with mutually advantageous constraints, provided she expects others to do
so as well. Of course, this leaves the constrained maximizer open to being
exploited. However, Gauthier endeavors to show that it is rational to be so
disposed, since under most conditions the net benefits of cooperation exceed
the risk of being exploited. Thus, it is rational to internalize, or to
intentionally cultivate as a disposition, moral principles used in decision‐
making; it is likewise irrational to straightforwardly appeal to preference‐
fulfillment, since fewer net benefits are made available by straightforward
maximizing.
The fourth feature of his theory is the proviso on the initial bargaining
position (or the list of things that an individual brings to the bargaining
table). This was adapted from the proviso of Locke in his version of social
contract theory.18 This proviso prohibits bettering one’s own position by
worsening that of others during the process of bargaining. At the bargaining
table, each person’s prospects post‐agreement cannot be worse than they
would have been in the absence of an agreement. Otherwise, no one has a
reason to interact at all. For example, if my options on the bargaining table
were either slavery or abject poverty, I would have no reason to make such a
choice at all. Clearly, I would be better off not cooperating at all with people
who gave me only those two choices! So, since society is viewed as a
cooperative venture, with each willingly complying with the agreed‐upon
From John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. Second treatise, ch. v.
paragraph 27. London, 1690.
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constraints, then they must find acceptable the initial bargaining position.
The proviso is thus posited as necessary in order for rational persons to
bargain at all—it ensures that agreement is made willingly and not
coercively.
Gauthier holds that a contractarian theory of morals developed from
rational choice theory has certain strengths and certain weaknesses. By
demonstrating the rationality of compliance with agreed constraints,
morality is “given a sure grounding in a weak and widely accepted
conception of practical rationality.”19 His is the only account that
demonstrates that morality can be shown to be rational from non‐moral
suppositions—without reverting to a universalistic conception of rationality.
However, there are weaknesses to it, he admits. The agreement
excludes certain people. Only persons who are roughly equal can be parties
to an agreement. Not all people are equal. Exploitation of those not party to
the agreement, by the parties to the agreement, is therefore possible. And
Gauthier admits that his theory has no place to condemn this. The Lockean
proviso against bettering one’s own position by worsening that of others
only governs the process of the hypothetical agreement, which assumes that
the parties to it are equally rational. Hence, morality only arises from the
agreement of rational parties. Since not all people are rational, not all are
parties to the agreement. Hence, Gauthier admits, there is no place for
condemning all cases of exploitation on his theory.
19

Gauthier, p. 17.
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Western society can be represented well as a cooperative venture. It
has discovered, he says, how individuals (each in the pursuit of her own
interests) work for mutual benefit. If we consider the vast quantity of
material goods, the ever‐increasing lifespan of individuals, and the overall
level of well‐being of individuals (to name just some of the benefits), we can
see what has resulted from this discovery.20 However, perhaps too much
credit has been given to the idealization of the market in the attainment of
these goods, and not enough credit given to the role of cooperation. If this is
correct, Gauthier says, then contractarianism is able to express the concern
that we do in fact all have in maintaining the conditions necessary to make
possible these and further benefits.
Changing technologies have enhanced the well‐being of certain
persons who contribute little (or not at all) to the mutual benefit of society.
Only those who contribute can be parties to the agreement. Thus, not all
persons (for example, the handicapped) are parties to the agreement.
Intuitively, all persons should be participants in an agreement that justifies
moral claims that apply to all of us. On Gauthier’s theory, however, not all
people are such participants. This is a weakness, he admits.
Despite these weaknesses however, Gauthier holds that morals by
agreement is sufficient to explain why we ought to be moral: it serves our
self‐interest to comply with constraints that have been arrived at through a
hypothetical agreement. It provides a reason for all of us to be moral.
20

Ibid. p. 18.
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This summary of Gauthier’s view serves as an apt introduction to the
two arguments that I develop in the rest of the paper. I will now turn to my
first argument.
Section 2
As we have seen, Gauthier claims that the hypothetical agreement
justifies morality; it provides a reason to be moral. The hypothetical
agreement is a thought experiment: if we consider our existing practices,
each of us would be led, ultimately, to consider ourselves in a situation
devoid of any social practices or moral conceptions. From this imagined
situation, we each ask ourselves which constraints we would prefer, since it
is clear that some set of constraints are better than no constraints at all. The
set we choose together, in light of the self‐interest of each of us, forms the
content of a hypothetical agreement. This explains the basis of morality; it is
a test for which of our moral claims are legitimate, or justified, moral claims.
The hypothetical agreement thus gives each of us a reason to be moral.
I will claim that social practices and our own moral conception are
central to our self‐conception. Thus, placing ourselves in a situation devoid
of these features results in our imagining a person who is quite foreign to us.
If this imagined person is sufficiently foreign to us, then we have reason to
doubt the relevance of the agreement to us. Such is the case. Since it is no
longer each of us who are parties to the agreement, two conclusions are
reached. One: the question of which moral claims are actually justified

17
remains an open question. Two: the agreement no longer provides a reason
for us to be moral.
2.1
On Gauthier’s account, moral practices are rational to the extent that
they would be agreed to by a unanimous hypothetical agreement of rational
persons, even though they constrain an individual’s preference fulfillment.
But why, he asks in a 1991 paper, is it rational to accept only those
constraints that would be agreed upon, and not rational to simply accept our
existing moral practices?21 After all, it does seem rational to comply with our
existing practices, some might say, since it is compliance with them that gives
us a reputation whereby it is likely that others will cooperate with us on
future occasions. Thus, it seems that our existing moral practices already
provide us with a reason to be moral.
In answering these questions, Gauthier asks us to engage in a thought
experiment by imagining a certain society. In this society, there is a set of
practices that constrains the choices of the individuals of which the society is
comprised. If each individual had taken into account only her desires, aims
and interests, she would have chosen to always serve such, and she would
have not complied. Also in this society it is prima facie advantageous to
comply with this set of practices, since those who are not disposed to comply
with them are excluded from the voluntary cooperation of the others. Such
David Gauthier. “Why Contractarianism?”, in Contractarianism and
Rational Choice. Ed. Peter Vallentyne. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991. p. 26.

21
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practices are, in this society, constitutive of the morality of that society. But,
he continues, we need not consider these practices morally justified; they are
not the product of agreement. These practices simply constrain the choices
of each individual in a way that each finds rationally acceptable. It is
prudential to comply; compliance leads to mutual benefits.
Next he guides us to imagine that the persons in this society each,
individually, examine the practices that constitute their morality. They will
test these practices against their own desires, aims and interests (with the
knowledge that the others are doing the same). At this point they may begin
to question why the existing practices are the ones with which this society
complies. Why exactly these practices and not others? For, of course, they
will recognize that their set of practices is not the only set that will yield
mutual benefits; there are many possible moral orders.
Each person in this imagined society can expect to benefit from a
disposition to comply with the existing practices of his society. For one who
ignores such practices would surely be worse off than one who did not. Since
each may have a reason to reject the status quo, two options become clear for
each individual: will I benefit more from abandoning morality entirely (and
not recognizing any constraint), or will I benefit more from rejecting some
set of constraints in favor of an alternative set? Since cooperation will be
considered necessary for mutual benefit, the latter option will be deemed
superior. At this point, then, the question becomes not whether it is rational
to comply at all, but which set of practices is the rational set to choose.
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To answer this recent question, each person will examine his own
prospects among those sets that he expects are likely to be arrived at from
agreement with the others in his society. If his prospect is improved by a set
other than the existing one, he will have a real reason to demand a change in
the existing moral order. To say this in a more general way: if there are any
persons whose prospects could be improved by an agreement, then the
existing set of practices is recognized by such a person to be unstable.22 Of
course those whose prospects will worsen upon an agreement will resist
change; they will insist on the status quo. But if each is fixed on maximizing
her own preference‐fulfillment, this insistence is likely to be ignored by the
others.
This thought experiment is relevant to us in the following way. In the
actual world, we begin such deliberations from within an existing set of
moral practices which constrains our actions. From reflection on such fact,
we are led to the notion of an amended set of practices that would obtain the
agreement of everyone; this set will be recognized by each to be more stable
than the existing set. Thus, by reflection, we, as rational deliberators, are led

The task of clarifying Gauthier’s technical notion of stability is in order.
Stability is an ideal of rationality against which both practices and
agreements are adjudged. A practice or agreement is judged to be stable to
the extent that it expresses the way in which we would reason about our
actions in a natural (or pre‐social) environment. Thus, a pre‐moral, pre‐
social consideration of our preferences is considered stable. In Gauthier’s
imagined society, the existing practices were judged to be unstable because
they didn’t adequately reflect how we would reason, were we free from the
influence of others. So, a purely stable practice or agreement proceeds from
ourselves.

22
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from existing practices to that set of practices that would receive everyone’s
assent.
By our capacity for reflection, we will be led from here to a
consideration of which practices would be agreed to in a pre‐moral, pre‐
social context. For just as stability was gained by considering which sets of
practices would be agreed to in our actual context, even more stability will be
gained when we consider which practices would be agreed to in a context
devoid of any actual practices. Put in a different way: just as the status quo
turned out to be considered unstable in comparison with those sets of
practices that would receive everyone’s agreement, so this latter agreement
turns out to be conceived as unstable when compared with what would have
received agreement in a pre‐social context. Just as existing practices seemed
to be arbitrary to the extent that they did not correspond to what a rational
person would agree to, so the supposed agreement seems arbitrary in
relation to what would be accepted in a situation with no practices. This
arbitrariness should be avoided because it blinds us from our motivation to
be moral: it ultimately serves our self‐interest.
Gauthier continues his argument as follows. What a rational person
would agree to in her actual context depends on what her position is in
relation to the others making the agreement with her. Just what does she
bring to the table? This negotiating position is affected by the practices of
her society. In short, while agreement may well yield some set of practices
differing from the existing set, the agreement itself will be influenced by that
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prior set of practices, which themselves are not products of agreement. This
fact must call into question the rationality of the agreed‐upon practices. For
if a practice is rational so long as it would receive agreement, and the terms
of the agreement are tainted (or considered to be unstable) by existing moral
practices, we have reason to say that the agreement is impure. The
agreement then seems arbitrary as well. “The arbitrariness of existing
practices must infect any agreement whose terms are significantly affected
by them.”23
While rational agreement is a source of stability, the stability of it is
undermined by the circumstances in which it takes place, if such
circumstances are arbitrary. To get around this arbitrariness, individuals
will be led to move from considering the agreement as actual to considering
it as a hypothetical agreement. Individuals will consider which practices
they would have agreed to from a position not influenced by existing
practices. Such a position is purely rational. From this pre‐moral, pre‐social
context, the agreement regains its stability.
Stability is what links agreement to compliance. A stable agreement
gives us a clearer reason to be moral.
2.2
Central to Gauthier’s recently presented argument is the assumption
that imagining ourselves in a pre‐moral, pre‐social context is a possible task.

23
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It is not. I will seek to make this claim plausible. Then, I will explain its
implications for Gauthier.
A central part of our self‐conception consists in the roles that we
play.24 We are all sons or daughters; many of us are parents, brothers,
sisters, friends, and colleagues. Some roles are chosen reluctantly, others
willingly; still other roles are not chosen at all. We have a real choice of
whether to play the role of friend to a person. We may not like one of our co‐
workers, yet we willingly choose to play a role in the story of our co‐workers,
since we value our continued employment, and thus, we must continue to
interact with this disliked co‐worker.
Each role is a part of the narrative of some person or persons. We all
play one, or several, main or supporting roles in a network of interrelated
stories. The importance of our roles to the story of which they are a part is of
course contingent on the narrator(s) of each story.
Some roles are partially defined by certain actions we perform. I
make a purchase at a convenience store; I play the role of a customer of that
store—at least for one visit. I have a minor role in the story of that
convenience store. I ride the train; I play the role of a commuter. Once again,
I play a miniscule role in the story of public transit. I play a slightly larger
role in the story of public transit in my region. I play a still larger role in the
story of the particular train on which I am riding. Note that in these
I am indebted for much of these thoughts to Alisdair MacIntyre, see After
Virtue. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1981. See especially
chapter fifteen. While I credit him for much of the stimulation of these
concepts, they have been extended in the present paper.

24
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examples, we need not be aware of the role we are playing at the time we are
playing it.
Roles partially define social practices; conversely, practices partially
define roles. We cannot conceive of a racquetball game without racquetball
players. A man hitting a ball against a wall with a racquet is not playing
racquetball. The practice of racquetball needs multiple players. Racquetball
is a practice defined by rules; it is only in the context of the practice of
racquetball that the role of a racquetball player is conceivable.
Many practices have a conception of constraint that sustains and
partially defines them. Dining at a restaurant requires constraints of the
staff, management and patrons alike. The staff must perform certain duties;
management must ensure that the staff is performing said duties; patrons
must behave in at least a minimally courteous manner. Constraint makes the
practice of dining possible.
Like practices, roles possess the quality of constraining certain of our
choices. The role of an employee requires fulfilling certain job requirements.
These requirements may be ill‐defined, yet are central to the definition of any
job.
These recent comments are intended to point to the relations of roles,
practices, and the constraints necessary to sustain both. They form an
interlocking network; each relies on the other for their mutual intelligibility.
I said above that roles form a crucial part of our self‐conception. Now
it is clear that practices too are of some importance to that conception. For
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without practices, the importance of roles to our lives might seem
unimportant. But they clearly are, as I have shown. In the same manner,
constraint is a part of our self‐conception. Lacking constraint, roles and
practices cannot be sustained. They are not even intelligible.
With these considerations in mind, I am now in a position to ask of
myself if I can accomplish what Gauthier asks of me in his thought
experiment. Can I imagine myself in a situation in which I have no association
with other persons, and without any aspect of the interrelated network of
roles, practices and constraints so integral to our self‐conception? The
situation described by Gauthier must have these features. A pre‐social
situation is, of course, one in which there is no association between persons.
A pre‐moral situation is one in which there is no constraint. So, is it possible
to conceive of such a situation?
Certainly, we can imagine such a situation. It is easy to imagine a
person existing, in the actual world, without social practices or the moral
conceptions which underpin them. However, if I am right in my claims above
about the interlocking nature of roles, practices and constraints, then it
seems that this imagined person must lack these features. And since these
concepts are crucial to our self‐conception, then abstracting these concepts
away from ourselves, in the process of reflection endorsed by Gauthier,
results in our imagining a person who is very, very different from us. For the
process of imagining a person who lacks some of the defining characteristics
of who I am results in a person who is not me!
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Now, if I were to ask this imagined person, abstracted of all
conception of roles, practices and constraints, to choose which set of
constraints would serve his self‐interest, any answer provided seems
irrelevant to that set of constraints that would serve my self‐interest, since
this person is sufficiently foreign to me. Moreover, since this chosen set of
constraints forms the content of the hypothetical agreement, it too loses its
relevance to me.
In short, abstracting away from our self‐conception in the way that
Gauthier asks of us leads each of us to an imagined person. Since this
person’s choice of constraints forms the basis of the hypothetical agreement,
and his choices are irrelevant to each of us, the agreement itself is irrelevant
to each of us. Moreover, since the agreement is irrelevant, and it is supposed
to provide a reason for each of us to be moral, it turns out that whatever
reason is suggested in this regard is irrelevant to us as well. Gauthier’s
morals by agreement turns out to be irrelevant to our individual lives.
2.3
A contractarian might object at this point. I am assuming, he might
object, that it is impossible to conceive of ourselves in a different situation
than the ones we find ourselves in. But clearly, I can imagine myself living in
a fourteenth‐century medieval society. But if this is possible, then what
difficulty is there in imagining ourselves in a pre‐moral, pre‐social situation?
I must make clear that I am arguing for the impossibility of fully
conceiving ourselves in a pre‐moral, pre‐social situation. From this claim,
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however, it does not follow that we cannot conceive of our own existence in
such a state. It certainly is possible to imagine the essence of myself in a
situation in which I have no contact with others, and no conception of
constraint. And such a person would indeed be partially recognizable as
myself. But this imagined person lacks the features necessary to make the
decision that Gauthier asks us to make. Gauthier makes the mistake of
assuming that the essence of our selves are capable of possessing the desires
relevant to the choice of constraints. This is mistaken.
Our desires, however, are pieces of our individual stories. As such,
they cannot be considered in isolation from the network of roles, practices
and constraints of which they are a part. Let us suppose that Gauthier is
correct in asserting that our essential selves are capable of possessing
desires. If this were the case, then it appears that at least some of our desires
are an essential part of who we are. It would also be true that these desires
would be unchanging, since this is part of the meaning of an essential self.
But most of our desires do change. Remember what your desires
were like in your childhood. Are any of those desires the same as your
current desires? Probably very few of your desires are the same as when you
were a child. This changing nature of our desires suggests that almost all of
our desires develop, deepen, and alter throughout our lives. They are not
essential features of our selves.
It seems, then, that a better account of our desires is that they form a
crucial piece of the story of our lives. This claim accounts for the changing

27
nature of our desires. If we were to abstract away from the story of our lives,
conceiving of only our essential selves, then it is difficult to imagine which
desires (if any) we would have. Now, suppose that there were some desires
that remained as features of our essential selves. How would we know them?
How could we distinguish which desires are the essential ones? Since it is
entirely unclear, therefore, which desires our essential self would possess,
how is it that we can ask our essential self which constraints would be
preferred by this essential self? This is impossible. Were this possible, a
justification of constraint would be possible. But such justification would
come at the cost of our actual desires, which are a crucial part of our lives.
This justification, then, would remain irrelevant to our lives.
In short, fully imagining ourselves in a pre‐moral, pre‐social situation
is impossible. If it were possible, then our essential selves would possess
desires. They do not. But even if they did, which constraints would be
chosen by our essential self would be impossible to know, since it is entirely
unclear which of our desires would belong to our essential selves. In any
case, then, Gauthier’s hypothetical agreement remains irrelevant to our lives.
2.4
In the next section, I will provide an argument that will serve as a
challenge to Gauthier’s conclusion that self‐interest grounds our moral
claims. Moral rationalism is the view that morality is able to provide reasons
for action. If this view is correct, then morality is able, directly, to provide
reasons for action. If this is true, then it is difficult to see the need for
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Gauthier’s supposition that by abstracting from our moral practices, we are
able to fully account for reasons for action. For, if our moral practices already
provide normative reasons for action, regardless of whether or not it serves
our self‐interest, then there is no need to demonstrate, as Gauthier supposes,
that morality proceeds from our preferences in order to also demonstrate
that it gives us reasons.
On moral rationalism, morality gives us reasons directly. For
Gauthier, morality provides reasons only because it satisfies our preferences.
It seems important, then, that he is able to demonstrate this. If however,
moral rationalism is correct, then such demonstration is unnecessary. The
next section is devoted to expanding this argument.
Section 3
Gauthier’s thought experiment, discussed in the last section, is
presented in a 1991 paper. The thesis of that paper is that contractarianism
provides the most plausible resolution to the foundational crisis that
morality faces.25 His resolution to this purported crisis is implausible. By
putting contractarianism in conversation with moral rationalism, we are able
to see that deliberative justification, his proposed resolution to the
foundational crisis, implies an implausible consequence about moral
evaluation.
I will begin by briefly sketching Gauthier’s argument for deliberative
justification. I will then present one argument for moral rationalism. I will
25

Gauthier, p. 15.
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attempt to bolster this latter argument, and then to show that, in light of it,
deliberative justification leads to an implausible consequence about moral
evaluation. I will conclude by pointing to the difficulty of answering any
questions about what grounds our moral claims, and to one view that might
be taken in light of this difficulty.
3.1
“Morality faces a foundational crisis. Contractarianism offers the only
plausible resolution of this crisis.”26 Gauthier presents this straightforward
thesis. The foundational crisis of morality, for Gauthier, is that there is an
inconsistency between what our moral language presupposes—“objective
values that help explain our behavior, and the psychological states—desires
and beliefs—that, given our present world view, actually provide the best
explanation”27 of our behavior. This worldview affirms both that it is our
preferences which explain our behavior and that morality is conceived as a
set of constraints on such behavior. If we are primarily disposed to do what
we prefer, then morality, constraining our preferences, stands in need of
justification. Otherwise, it stands in danger of being considered as no “more
than an anthropological curiosity,”28 a relic of a bygone age. The project of
contractarianism, therefore, is to provide a justification of morality that is
consistent with our present worldview.

Ibid. p. 15.
Ibid. p. 16.
28 Ibid. p. 16.
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In short, Gauthier conceives of the crisis of morality as that of
justifying constraint. “From the standpoint of the agent, moral considerations
present themselves as constraining his choices and actions, in ways
independent of his desires, aims, and interests . . . [This] reveals clearly what
is in question—the ground of constraint.”29
For Gauthier, such a crisis of morality is a part of our present
worldview. This worldview provides the best explanation of our behavior.
Such explanation takes our actions as a direct result of our preferences. We
conceive of ourselves as agents who make choices and who perform those
actions that tend to maximize preference fulfillment. This is integral to our
“deep sense of self;”30 is partly constitutive of who we take ourselves to be.
Since preference‐determined action is basic to our self‐conception, any
constraint on our actions (and consequently, our preferences) must be
justified. Hence, morality must be justified. This argument should be
familiar by this point to my readers.
Contrary to this conception of morality is that of an older worldview
that has been abandoned: there exists objective values and these values help
explain our behavior. For example, the claim, “genocide is evil” is seen to be,
in some sense, true of the world. Our moral language, by and large, reflects
this view of the world as containing true, objective moral claims. However,
Gauthier insists that this view of the world is inadequate to explain certain
facts about our behavior.
29
30
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This line of thinking is closely aligned with that of Gil Harman.31 For
Harman, if values were real features of the world, they would possess some
explanatory power. However, they lack this power. Therefore, values are
subjective.
Gauthier too holds that values are subjective. They are relative to
each individual’s considered preferences.32 He holds, like Harman, that if
objective values were to exist, they would explain certain facts about our
behavior. Since the worldview that explains our behavior in terms of
objective values is insufficient, we have abandoned it for one that denies
objective values and instead seeks to explain our behavior in terms of our
preferences.
But why, we might ask at this point, should our preferences be
constrained at all? No such justification is available in our present
worldview, as it was on the older one, continues Gauthier. What possible
reason, then, could we have for accepting any constraints on our
preferences? “[W]hat justifies paying attention to morality, rather than
dismissing it as an appendage of outworn beliefs? We ask, and seem to find
no answer.”33 There simply is, asserts Gauthier, no extra‐moral foundation
upon which to answer such questions. There may be a moral foundation that
provides an answer; we may have a moral reason for being moral. But there
See Gilbert Harman, Explaining Value: And Other Essays in Moral
Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.
32 He develops the notion of a considered preference; this is the result of
sufficient reflection on our preferences. See Gauthier, Morals By Agreement,
chapter 2.
33 Gauthier, p. 16.
31
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is no way of answering such questions that doesn’t already presuppose a
moral framework. However, since there is no moral framework, these
questions are unanswerable. Thus, it is in this sense that the crisis of
morality is foundational. The language of morality assumes a conception of
morality; our explicit worldview expresses a differing, and superior,
conception.
Gauthier proceeds to provide a reply to an objection. Perhaps
morality needs no justification, rather it is the job of moral philosophy simply
to systematize our moral judgments “and so to give us a deeper
understanding of what moral justification is.”34
The problem with this, Gauthier says, is that such an objection
recognizes only one mode of justifying our actions: that of justifying our
actions within a moral framework. But this clearly is an inaccurate picture of
the way that we usually justify our actions. We primarily engage in
deliberative justification. This is understood as follows. In making choices,
we often have before us two conflicting desires. In such a case, “[w]e order
our preferences, in relation to decision and action, so that we may choose in a
way that maximizes our expectation of preference fulfillment. And in so
doing, we show ourselves to be rational agents, engaged in deliberation and
deliberative justification. There is simply nothing else for practical
rationality to be.”35
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The deliberative justification account of practical rationality,
continues Gauthier, is part of our present world‐view. He takes this account
to be rationally more fundamental than the objector’s view. It appears then,
that morality (as a mode of justification purportedly on par with deliberative
justification) is pushed on the defensive, and must explain why it can make
any claims on those who refuse to recognize the existence of any moral
framework. For Gauthier, there simply is no extra‐moral foundation that is
able to answer them.
So, how is it then that morality can be justified? If morality is to be
saved, “[t]he first step is to embrace deliberative justification, and recognize
that morality’s place must be found within, and not outside, its framework.”36
How is this to be done? The resolution is his version of contractarianism. On
this account, the set of constraints which constitute morality are limited to
only those actions which maximize preference fulfillment. In a society,
however, our preferences often conflict with those of others. Thus, only
those actions that would be agreed by everyone to be mutually advantageous
are moral actions. Thus, the constraints on our behavior are voluntary.
Morality is then justified.
We have then, for Gauthier, a foundational crisis of morality. That is,
morality, if it is to be saved, must be justified in light of a more accurate
conception of how we make choices: deliberative justification. It is thus that
contractarianism is able to resolve the crisis.
36
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3.2
By placing deliberative justification in conversation with moral
rationalism, the former begins to appear less plausible as a resolution to the
foundational crisis. I will expand this claim by giving some brief explanation
of moral rationalism. Then, I will present one simple argument for its
plausibility, as outlined by Russ Shafer‐Landau. At the end of this discussion,
moral rationalism will be seen to be superior for two reasons. One: it
provides a plausible account of moral evaluation (where deliberative
justification will be shown to fail). Two: it allows us to be silent about
whether or not there exist objective values.
“Moral rationalism is the view that moral obligations entail reason for
actions.”37 Suppose my friend Alison performs an act. She explains that she
did it because it was the right thing to do. Suppose that she is correct about
this; the reason she performed the act was because it was the right thing to
do. Now, what justifies her in performing this act? Usually, in such a case,
the justification of her act is not called into question. But if an act’s rightness
did not provide a reason for performing it, then it seems that we would call it
into question. Now, if moral rationalism is false, then the justification that
Alison provides for her action would be incoherent. Since it is not
incoherent, moral rationalism is not false. These considerations imply that
the rightness of an action is a good reason for performing it.

Russ Shafer‐Landau, “Moral Rationalism” in Ethical Theory. Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing, 2007. p. 174.
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Now, Shafer‐Landau says, consider immoral acts. When we assess
someone’s behavior as morally unjustified, it is implied that she has violated
some moral order. Suppose that this, or any other, moral order did not
provide a reason to act. Then, we no longer have a reason to avoid certain
actions solely on the grounds that they are immoral or improper. But,
intuitively, this seems both conceptually confused and very unfair. To say,
for example, that Alison ought not to have stolen from her grandmother
because it violated some code of conduct, and still affirming that she had no
reason to not steal from her grandmother, seems conceptually confused. And
it seems unfair to blame Alison for stealing, and yet also to admit that she had
no reason not to steal. “The fairness and appropriateness of moral
evaluation rest on an agent’s attentiveness to reasons.”38 If a person claims
correctly that she did not ignore any reasons to act, she cannot be blamed for
violating any moral code. This is a plausible claim. But this claim is true only
if moral rationalism is true.
We are left, concludes Shafer‐Landau, with two choices. One: endorse
moral rationalism. Two: admit that an agent’s attentiveness to reasons has
no bearing whatsoever on moral evaluation. Those who deny moral
rationalism, and commit themselves to the second option are further
committed to two tasks. They must explain what serves as a basis for moral
evaluation other than reasons. They also must explain how this basis avoids
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the seeming unfairness of blaming persons for actions they had no reason to
avoid.
Now, if moral rationalism is correct, then Gauthier’s deliberative
justification seems implausible. For deliberative justification affirms that
morality does not provide reasons for actions. The ultimate reason for
performing any action, according to contractarians, is whether or not that
action serves our self‐interest by maximizing our preference‐fulfillment.
So, is moral rationalism correct? I will now seek to bolster Shafer‐
Landau’s argument by considering an example. Suppose that my friend
Alison is asked to explain why she donated money to her favorite charity.
She explains that she did this because it was the right thing to do. Suppose
again, that she is not lying about this; this truly was her reason for acting. If
the rightness of donating her money in this way did not provide a reason for
her to do it, then she would not be admired for doing it. Suppose that instead
of citing the rightness of donating as her reason, she said that she did it
simply because she preferred to do it, given the circumstances. It seems
implausible to say that she would be admired for simply maximizing her
preference‐fulfillment in this way.
Now suppose that Gauthier is correct in asserting that deliberative
justification is the fundamental mode of how we reason practically. If this
were the case, then the rightness of donating would provide no reason for
Alison to donate the money that she did. Her reason for donating the money
would then be simply because she preferred it. Then, clearly, she would not
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be admired for simply doing what she preferred. Likewise, if Alison were to
steal money from her grandmother, she did this because she preferred it.
And, similarly, it is unlikely that stealing money in this way would be
disapproved. Clearly, this is both conceptually confused and unfair.
3.3
Let me consider a few objections. The first objection to the claim that
moral rationalism is true denies Shafer‐Landau’s claim that, were moral
rationalism false, we would be left with affirming conceptually confused
statements regarding the moral evaluation of an action. Shafer‐Landau
claims that to say, for example, that someone should be kind to his friends,
while at the same time affirming that he has no reason to be kind to his friend
is conceptually confused. But we need not be confused, says this objector.
Perhaps, instead of affirming moral rationalism, we can evaluate an action
from two perspectives: from the point of view of reasons and from the point
of view of morality. So, from the point of view of morality, being kind to your
friends is the right thing to do. But from the point of view of reasons, if
someone has no desire to be kind to her friends, then she has no reason to act
in this manner. We can affirm both statements without confusion. So goes
the objection.
If we deny moral rationalism in this way, however, the confusion
would remain. If we look at a case of extreme wrongdoing, it is clear that
Shafer‐Landau’s argument is unaffected by this objection. When we say that
someone should not have sexually molested her own children, we are both

38
saying that it is wrong for her to have done so, and that she had a real reason
to avoid doing this. However, if moral rationalism is false, and she did not
have a reason to avoid molesting her children, then we could not disapprove
of her action. But, of course, we do disapprove of her action. It is clear that
she had a reason to not molest her children: because it is wrong.
It is equally clear that an appeal to desire in this case would be
inappropriate. Suppose that morality didn’t provide reasons for action, and
preference‐fulfillment provided the basis of moral evaluation instead. If this
were the case, then we would have to say that parents who do not molest
their children, avoid doing so simply because they prefer not to do so. Most
would affirm, it seems, that parents have a reason, regardless of their desire,
not to molest their children: simply because it is wrong.
Now, if we were to evaluate the above action in the way suggested by
the objector, we would affirm the following two separate propositions about
one action. One: the parent was wrong to have sexually molested her
children. Two: she had no reason to avoid sexually molesting her children.
It seems clear to me that almost no one would affirm the second proposition.
While it may appear that in some cases (such as being kind to your friends),
that the suggested analysis might work, when we consider an extreme case
such as this one, it becomes clear that there is an intimate connection
between the claims of morality and the reasons it provides.
A consideration of this extreme case also provides an answer to a
second possible objection. One might object that the rightness of an action
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only provides a reason for those who already have another reason to be
moral. For those who view themselves as outside any moral framework,
however, adherence to morality might appear as a kind of fetish. Since such
persons have no desire for morality, the rightness of an action fails to provide
a reason for them to perform that action.
But if we consider that no one would affirm that someone would ever
have a reason to molest her children, then it becomes clear that morality is
more than a fetish; there are some claims that apply to all. The questions of
which moral claims are true, and which moral claims apply to whom and
under which circumstances have not been discussed. It is clear, however,
that morality provides reasons for action.
3.4
These considerations about moral evaluation point to the plausibility of
moral rationalism and the implausibility of deliberative justification. But
where does this leave the foundational crisis, with which I began the section?
If moral rationalism is correct, then it appears that morality does not indeed
stand in need of justification.
But, we might ask, what about the apparently strong intuition that
morality does indeed need justification? This line of thinking is of course not
new. Not only can elements of it be found in much of twentieth‐century
moral philosophy; we can think of Hume, of course, and before him Hobbes.
It can also be traced further back to Thrasymachus of Plato’s Republic. We
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can also identify many of our friends and family as a part of this tradition.
What can the moral rationalist say to these people?
It seems, of course, that there is a competing intuition that might also
be strong; many people have no trace of moral skepticism at all. Many of
these same people simply comply with the moral practices of their society
without question. For these people, morality needs no justification.
These considerations suggest that perhaps we should say nothing to
the moral skeptic. Certainly, it is possible to argue that one moral code is
superior to another. But perhaps morality, on the whole, is such that no
justification of it can be given. Morality might simply be a crucial part of who
we are, as humans.
I claimed at the beginning of this section there are two advantages
that moral rationalism has over deliberative justification. It avoids the
implausible claim about moral evaluation discussed in Section 3.2. But the
second advantage is that it allows us to remain silent about the existence of
objective values, which was one of Gauthier’s critiques of the older
worldview. Shafer‐Landau reminds us that questions about the ground of
normativity are prevalent, and very difficult to answer. He also admits that
moral rationalism fares no better than other accounts in attempting to
answer these questions.39 Perhaps these questions will always remain a
feature of our inquiries into morality. But by affirming moral rationalism, we
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are able to simply assert that morality is able to provide reasons, without
committing to whether or not moral claims are “objective,” or “subjective.”
Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented two arguments against David
Gauthier’s contractarianism. The first argument was as follows.
Gauthier’s hypothetical agreement is the object of a thought‐
experiment wherein we are asked to consider which constraints we would
prefer in a pre‐social, pre‐moral situation. A consideration of constraints
from this situation proves more stable, since it relates deeply to how we
conceive of ourselves. However, I have argued, that since roles, practices,
and the constraints that sustain and partially define them are central to our
self‐conception, the imagined person resulting from an abstraction of our
social situations is sufficiently foreign to us so as to render the hypothetical
agreement irrelevant to us.
The second argument was that since deliberative justification implies
an implausible view about moral evaluation, it fails as a resolution to the
foundational crisis. Moral rationalism was presented as an alternative
superior resolution.
I have sought to make plausible these claims in the hope of weakening
the cumulative case for Gauthier’s contractarianism. If I am correct in my
claims, what does this mean? If my claim that roles, practices and constraints
are central to our self‐conception, and that the hypothetical agreement fails
to attain any relevance to us, as actual beings, it seems that I have begun a
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sketch for a richer account of us as actual, moral beings. This account begins
from the plausible intuition that most of us conceive of ourselves as existing
within a moral framework, and that this framework is interwoven into our
self‐conception.
On this account, then, a justification of morality is not necessary. Nor
is this descriptive account intended (primarily) to provide any answer to the
moral skeptic. It may, however, perform these functions. If this account is
developed, the moral skeptic may perhaps come to see morality as basic to
her own self‐conception, and may perhaps from this infer that she has a good
reason to be moral.
Am I evading the question? Is it part of the role of the moral
philosopher to provide a justification of morality? In Section 2, I argued that
the interlocking network of roles, practices and constraints are central to our
self‐conception. If I am correct about this, and my recent comments are on
target, then it seems that morality is simply a part of who we are. Maybe this
is all we can say on the matter. After all, we must end our inquiries
somewhere, just as the present paper has now ended.
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